



Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung

# When and what to trace from public health perspective (+ synergies between public health and food safety)



Marion Gottschald, Alexander Falenski, Marco Rügen, Birgit Lewicki, Isaak Gerber, Dominic Tölle, Annemarie Käsbohrer and Armin A. Weiser

## Three aspects of outbreak investigation

Epidemiological analyses	Microbiological analyses	Tracing analyses			
<ul> <li>descriptive</li> <li>systematic explorative interviews of cases (and controls)</li> <li>analytical</li> <li>case-control-studies</li> <li>cohort studies</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>detection of identical pathogen in pathogen in environment.</li> <li>and for the form of the</li></ul>	<ul> <li>trace-back</li> <li>of contaminated/suspected food leads to common source (e.g. processor, producer)</li> <li>trace-forward</li> <li>does distribution of contaminated food match distribution of cases?</li> </ul>			
Evidence					



## **Purpose of tracing**

- identify source of contamination
- identify distribution of contaminated food

warning of consumers remove contaminated food from market

• compare distribution of cases + contaminated food

strengthen epidemiological association



## When and what to trace?

Tracing is resource-intensive

- → coordination of many investigators, different authorities, many counties/countries
- $\rightarrow$  decide when and what to trace


You might not have the resources to trace all suspected foods. Some paths might be misleading. You have to weigh the effort and benefit.

→ review all available data in a multidisciplinary team (epidemiologists, microbiologists, tracing experts)

detailed information on cases, delivery dates, quantities, sources + conditions of food received, shipping containers, labels, documents, lot numbers, facilities involved, sampling results



## When to trace?



Marion Gottschald, 9 October 2019, FoodChain-Lab training, Madrid, Spain

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## When to trace? Further indications

#### Pathogen

- ightarrow is uncommon
- $\rightarrow$  is emerging/re-emerging
- $\rightarrow$  limited knowledge about pathogen  $\rightarrow$  gain experience about its ecology
- $\rightarrow$  causes severe diseases


#### Food

- $\rightarrow$  expected to be eaten raw or lightly heated (vegetables, shell eggs, shellfish)
- $\rightarrow$  unlicensed, illegally sold food involved
- $\rightarrow$  food is adulterated

#### New or unusual vehicle




## **Steps of an outbreak investigation**






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## **Steps of an outbreak investigation**










## Case definition – which cases to trace back?

#### Exclusion criteria:

- genotype of isolate different from outbreak strain
- secondary cases
  - infection transmitted person-to-person
  - no exposure to contaminated food item
- (travel-related cases)
  - travel history abroad prior to a certain period of time before onset of symptoms
  - relevant for e.g. HAV outbreak

If many cases: select the most promising cases/clusters to trace back

 e.g. EHEC outbreak 2011 → 4000 cases → only 7 clusters traced back (well described; most different from each other; in part travel groups)




## Case definition – which cases to trace back?

- Focus on e.g.
  - $\rightarrow$  Confirmed cases
  - $\rightarrow$  Well-described cases
    - $\rightarrow$  Detailed information on diet
    - $\rightarrow$  Limited period of when products were bought/restaurant was visited
    - → Kitchens with well-defined menus (catering, restaurants, community catering (schools/elderly homes/hospitals/meals-on-wheels) → person-specific information on consumed food)
  - $\rightarrow$  Retained samples (voluntary)
  - → Evidence higher for clusters of diseased persons than for single diseased persons

CAVE: All outbreaks are different!







## Explore cases

 ask for relevant exposure (food intake (what/where), other diseases, travel history, sexual contacts) → identify what is common to all cases

#### For traceback analyses:


#### Who ate what, when, how much and how?

• gather information on (suspect) product  $\rightarrow$  as detailed as possible

→product name, lot number, best before date, print code (eggs), egg packer (eggs), date and place of shopping or restaurant visit, package size …


- usual consumption and shopping habits
- photos of fridge content
- photos of packaging of (suspect) product → product name, weight, lot number, best before date, …
- limit shopping date/date of restaurant visit as much as possible





tracing







### **Evaluate hypotheses**

## Interpreting example from EHEC, 2011:

b. Matched case control study in 3 hospitals focussed on fruits and vegetables, May – June 2011


Food Item	Case Subjects Exposed	Control Subjects Exposed	Matched Odds Ratio (95% CI)	P Value		
no./total no. (%)						
Sprouts	6/24 (25)	7/80 (9)	4.35 (1.05–18.0)	0.04		
Cucumbers	22/25 (88)	52/79 (66)	3.53 (0.96–12.9)	0.06		
Apples	22/24 (92)	57/81 (70)	3.91 (0.86-17.7)	0.08		
Peppers	16/24 (67)	35/80 (44)	2.66 (0.90-7.9)	0.08		
Strawberries	19/26 (73)	43/81 (53)	2.33 (0.90-6.0)	0.08		

Table 1. Vegetables or Fruits Evaluated in a Case–Control Study in the German Outbreak.\*

Buchholz et al., N Engl J Med 2011; 365:1763-1770

## What food item would you like to trace?







# Communication to public/media: implications on companies vs. authorities

**Tracing investigations**  $\rightarrow$  irreparable reputational damage to food companies

- $\rightarrow$  Be careful with interpretations (common source or just high market share)
- → every investigation step (also epidemiological, microbiological) + communication to media/public must be accurate
- $\rightarrow$  otherwise: legal disputes, compensation claims

E.g. EHEC outbreak 2011  $\rightarrow$  communication error on Spanish cucumbers

© BILD newspaper: "The deadly germ comes from Spain"



## **Communication between authorities during investigation**

public health authorities food safety authorities discuss available information prioritize (what to trace?) agree on investigation plan regularly share updates on tracing investigation joint interpretation of results (how do tracing results relate to epi-, lab-, environmental results?) re-evaluate (tracing) investigation strategy based on multidisciplinary results

Ideally even before crisis:

build functional network, set up contact list, set up tracing system, develop joint protocols, training

## Summary

- Tracing is resource-intensive
  - $\rightarrow$  Focus on promising starting points for tracing
- Use synergies between public and food safety authorities
   → E.g. for interviewing the cases
- Regularly share updates on your analyses with multidisciplinary team
  - $\rightarrow$  Facilitates interpretation of results + re-evaluation of strategy





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## **Thank you for your attention**

## Marion Gottschald

#### Federal Institute for Risk Assessment

Max-Dohrn-Str. 8-10, 10589 Berlin, GERMANY Tel. +49 30 - 184 12 - 0 Food Fax +49 30 - 184 12 - 99099 bfr@bfr.bund.de www.bfr.bund.de



#### **FoodChain-Lab Team** Tel. +49 30 - 184 12 - 88888

foodrisklabs@bfr.bund.de https://foodrisklabs.bfr.bund.de